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In many industries, Internet referral services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or bymanufacturers, serve as digitally enabled lead generators in electronic markets, directing consumer trafﬁc to
downstream retailers in a distribution network. This reshapes the extended enterprise from the traditional net-
work of upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers to include midstream third-party and manufacturer-
owned referral services in the supply chain. We model competition between retailers in a supply chain with
such digitally enabled institutions and consider their impact on the optimal contracts among the manufacturer,
referral intermediary, and the retailers. Ofﬂine, retailers face a higher customer discovery cost. In return, they
can engage in price discrimination based on consumer valuations. Online, they save on the discovery costs but
lose the ability to identify consumer valuations. This critical trade-off drives ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies. We
derive the optimal contracts for different entities in the supply chain and highlight how these contracts change
with the entry of independent and manufacturer-owned referral services. The establishment of a referral ser-
vice is a strategic decision by the manufacturer. It leads to diversion of supply chain proﬁt from a third-party
infomediary to the manufacturer. Further, it enables the manufacturer to respond to an infomediary, by giving
itself greater ﬂexibility in setting the unit wholesale fee to the proﬁt-maximizing level. Both third-party and
manufacturer-sponsored referral services play a critical role in enabling retailers to discriminate across con-
sumers’ different valuations. Retailers use online referral services to screen out low-valuation consumers and
sell only to high-valuation consumers in the online channel. Our model thus endogenously derives a correlation
between consumer valuation and online purchase behavior. Finally, we show that under some circumstances, it
is too costly for the manufacturer to eliminate the referral infomediary.
Key words : internet referral services; electronic markets; price dispersion; franchise fees; discovery costs;
electronic intermediary; digital supply chain
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1. Introduction
Information technology plays a strategic role in the
digital supply chain of an extended enterprise by
changing the nature of the relationships among a
broad array of partners such as upstream manufactur-
ers, midstream intermediaries, and downstream retail-
ers. In particular, the past few years have witnessed
the emergence of a number of online third-party
intermediaries whose basic objective is to provide
consumers with information about prices and prod-
ucts. These referral infomediaries, as they are often
called, offer consumers the opportunity to get price
quotes and invoice prices as well as product reviews
and speciﬁcations from enrolled brick-and-mortar
retailers. Although a referral infomediary does not
directly sell a product, it does shift much of the
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consumer search process from the physical platform
of the traditional retailer to the virtual world of the
Web. It therefore represents a midstream player in a
supply chain between a manufacturer and a dealer or
between dealers and consumers.
In response, many manufacturers have established
their own online referral services. Consider the auto
industry in the United States—an industry with $500
billion in revenues. Both infomediaries and man-
ufacturers now offer digitally enabled referral ser-
vices, which are growing in popularity. Industrywide,
25% of all new vehicles in 2005 were sold through
an online buying service, up from 4.7% in 2000,1
and Autobytel generated an estimated $83 billion in
car sales.2 Major original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) like GM and Ford have their own referral ser-
vices, such as GMBuyPower.com and FordDirect.com.
From these sites, consumers can conﬁgure a new car,
receive the list price, and move to a dealer site for
inventory and quotes. Crucially, manufacturers pro-
vide referrals to the dealer free of cost, and third-party
infomediaries charge referral fees to participating
dealers.
In the auto industry, franchise laws prevent a man-
ufacturer from directly selling to consumers. To avoid
the natural conﬂict with retailers that emerges when
a ﬁrm sells directly to its consumers, ﬁrms in other
industries are also beginning to use their own refer-
ral services to steer consumers to retailers.3 Tsay and
Agarwal (2004) point out that Hewlett-Packard’s (HP)
Commerce Center is not an online store per se—it
simply gives business customers an easy, point-and-
click way to order from an HP reseller. On the other
hand, computer manufacturers compete with online
third-party infomediaries such as CNET.com in the
customer lead-generation business. Referral services
are also common in the real estate, funeral services,
medical devices, and telecom industries.
In this paper, we look at only the pricing aspect
of infomediaries and do not consider their role in
1 http://www.autobytel.com/images/newsletters/march/2.html.
2 http://www.autobytel.com/content/home/help/pressroom/
pressreleases/index.cfm?id=4&ArticleID=138893.
3 A new channel can create channel conﬂict because consumers
compare prices and options across channels. For example, Forman
et al. (2006) show that use of the online channel depends on local
ofﬂine retail options.
providing independent information. The conventional
wisdom on Internet referral infomediaries is that they
are valuable to consumers because they reduce the
search costs of comparing prices in electronic mar-
kets and enable consumers to get binding price quotes
from retailers. However, the impact of these refer-
ral services on manufacturers is less clear. Neither
is the impact of competition between manufacturer-
sponsored and infomediary-sponsored referral ser-
vices on contractual fees and proﬁtability in a digi-
tal distribution network clear. A manufacturer’s entry
into the online referral business has implications for
pricing, allocation of supply chain proﬁts, and mid-
stream competition.
We focus on the distribution network of a supply
chain consisting of a manufacturer, an infomediary,
and two competing retailers. We consider a manu-
facturer that chooses not to engage in direct sales
to consumers, possibly to avoid conﬂict with retail-
ers, and examine the impact of the entry of a third-
party referral infomediary on the proﬁtability of the
upstream manufacturer and on the overall proﬁts in
a digitally enabled supply chain. In the context of an
extended enterprise, how does establishing its own
referral infomediary enable the manufacturer to re-
direct proﬁts in the supply chain back to itself? How
do the optimal contracts between the various parties
and the retailer’s optimal pricing strategies change?
Finally, we consider the costs and beneﬁts to the man-
ufacturer of eliminating the referral infomediary.
In a related paper, Chen et al. (2002) examine how an
infomediary affects market competition between re-
tailers, and contractual arrangements that they should
use in selling their services. The research shows that
a referral infomediary can serve as a device to enable
price discrimination across consumer search segments.
We extend their work by also examining the role of
manufacturer referral services in enabling the manu-
facturer to compete against the infomediary. We focus,
in particular, on the response of the manufacturer to
the presence of an infomediary, the impact of this
response on retailer pricing, and the reshaping of con-
tracts in the supply chain to competition between the
referral services.
In our model, consumers are heterogeneous both in
their valuations and in search behavior, so price dis-
persion exists in equilibrium, as in Varian (1980) and
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Narasimhan (1988). In the ofﬂine channel, consumers
physically walk into stores, and retailers determine
willingness to pay via a costly interaction. This
enables them to discriminate ofﬂine between high-
and low-valuation consumers. However, on line they
lose this ability to identify consumer valuations. In
the auto industry, for example, purchases are infre-
quent, with signiﬁcant time gaps. In such a setting, it
is reasonable to think of consumer preferences chang-
ing from one purchase to the next, so that valua-
tion information on consumers buying the product on
line is unavailable. Thus, we model a critical trade-off
retailers face between lower online customer discov-
ery costs versus greater consumer information ofﬂine.
The overriding theme of this paper is that retailers
can use referral infomediaries, whether third party or
manufacturer sponsored, as screening devices to iden-
tify high-valuation consumers. This enables retail-
ers to extract greater revenues from consumers but
is potentially mitigated by increased competition
between retailers. Any increase in retailers’ gross
proﬁt is, in turn, passed up the supply chain to either
the third-party infomediary or the manufacturer.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we
ﬁnd that the establishment of manufacturer refer-
ral services, despite no direct sales by the manufac-
turer to consumers, leads to a diversion of supply
chain proﬁts away from a third-party infomediary
and toward the manufacturer. As a result, the manu-
facturer’s proﬁt can increase even when total proﬁt in
the supply chain is reduced.
Second, we ﬁnd that online referral services are
used by retailers as a device to enable price discrimi-
nation based on consumer valuations. Despite assum-
ing no ex ante relationship between ofﬂine and online
search behavior and consumer valuations, we ﬁnd
endogenously that only high-valuation consumers
make online purchases. This mitigates the informa-
tion loss inherent in online purchase services for con-
sumer durables. On line, retailers cannot directly infer
consumer valuations, whereas valuation information
is more readily available ofﬂine.
Third, despite the potential to unravel the compet-
ing referral infomediary, the manufacturer is better off
leaving the infomediary in business if the proportion
of ofﬂine consumers is sufﬁciently high. To eliminate
the infomediary, the manufacturer must increase the
wholesale price, which could shut out a large segment
of the consumer market, leading to lower sales and
lower proﬁt for the manufacturer.
Fourth, the establishment of a referral service by the
manufacturer gives it greater ﬂexibility in responding
to an infomediary by setting a high wholesale price.
This additional ﬂexibility depends critically on het-
erogeneity among consumers. By charging a higher
wholesale price the upstream manufacturer alleviates
price competition among the downstream players,
leading to higher gross proﬁts for each retailer.
Finally, average online prices offered by retailers to
users of the manufacturer’s referral service are higher
than infomediary referral prices. This is similar to a
manufacturer’s suggested retail price, which is the
highest possible price consumers are expected to pay
under normal market conditions. Thus, this result also
reconciles well with practice.
Our paper is related to various strands of the lit-
erature on Internet-enabled supply chains. Much of
this work has focused on procurement and suppli-
ers. For example, Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) consider
a dynamic model with spot and long-term contract-
ing between suppliers and buyers in capital-intensive
industries, and Subramani (2004) considers how sup-
pliers can both create and retain value via the use
of information technology. In contrast, our focus is
on spot contracts in distribution, rather than procure-
ment, and on how the manufacturer and infomediary
can use these to generate and retain value.
In our model, digitization facilitates competition
between the manufacturer and the infomediaries
through their referral services, leading to a reshap-
ing of the extended enterprise. Speciﬁcally, digitiza-
tion is a vehicle to allow price discrimination across
consumers with different search behaviors and to
increase proﬁts in the supply chain. By using its own
referral site, the manufacturer can capture some of
this greater proﬁt for itself, rather than allow it to
be skimmed off by the infomediary. This would not
have been possible in the traditional ofﬂine world:
For infrequently purchased, high-priced goods, there
may not be an effective ofﬂine mechanism to engage
in price discrimination. Thus, digitization adds value
beyond what can be captured in an ofﬂine world.
On the face of it, online availability of prices would
seem to enhance market transparency. In a business-
to-business context, Zhu (2004) shows that increased
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transparency adversely affects ﬁrms’ incentives to join
an exchange. Granados et al. (2006) consider trans-
parency as a strategic choice for a monopolist sell-
ing to consumers. Baye and Morgan (2001) show, in a
model in which gatekeepers charge fees to ﬁrms for
advertising their prices, that price dispersion can per-
sist on the Internet. In our model, some proportion of
consumers switch on line, and referral services serve
as a mechanism to discriminate across consumers
with different valuations. Viswanathan et al. (2007)
ﬁnd that consumers who search for prices online
obtain lower prices for automobiles than those who
do not search online.
Digital supply networks are characterized by elec-
tronic interactions between different tiers of a value
chain (Straub et al. 2004). Early work on net-enabled
organizations and the concept of the extended enter-
prise focused on the role of information sharing in
facilitating cooperation and collaboration in the sup-
ply chain among suppliers, manufacturers, and retail-
ers (Choudhury et al. 1999, and Lin et al. 2000). The
entry of online infomediaries has changed the shape
of the extended enterprise by, in addition, bringing in
an element of competition into the supply chain.
Online competition between sellers is considered by
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2005) and in a supply chain
context by Ghose et al. (2005). More broadly, our
paper adds to a rich literature on electronic data inter-
faces (EDI). Competing approaches to measuring EDI
usage are evaluated by Massetti and Zmud (1996),
while the business value of EDI technology has been
studied by Lee et al. (1999), Chwelos et al. (2001), and
Mukhopadhyay and Kekre (2002).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 examines
a benchmark case with no referral services, and §4
analyzes the effect of the infomediary on retail compe-
tition. In §§5 and 6, we examine the impact of manu-
facturer referral services on equilibrium strategies and
policies. We provide numerical corroboration of our
results in §7. Section 8 discusses some extensions, and
we conclude with some business implications in §9.
All proofs are available in the online appendix.4
4 An online supplement to this paper is available on the
Information Systems Research website (http://isr.pubs.informs.org/
ecompanion.html).
2. Model
Consider a piece of merchandise with the follow-
ing features: Consumer purchases are relatively infre-
quent, and the price is high relative to consumers’
income. In such a setting, it is reasonable to expect
that relatively little information about consumer will-
ingness to pay may be available from online purchase
histories. Conversely, at an ofﬂine retail store, there
is often a negotiation over price, and in the process
a salesperson may be able to form a better esti-
mate of a consumer’s willingness to pay. Many con-
sumer durables ﬁt this description; examples include
cars, household electronic appliances, and real estate.
Throughout the paper, we use the automobile indus-
try to illustrate our model and results.
2.1. Supply Chain
We examine the retail end of a supply chain with a
single manufacturer and two competing retailers, D1
and D2. The manufacturer charges each retailer a fran-
chise fee, F , and a wholesale price, W , for each unit
of merchandise. We analyze the distribution end of
the supply chain under four scenarios: (i) no referral
services exist, (a benchmark case), (ii) there is a refer-
ral infomediary, (iii) both a referral infomediary and
manufacturer referral services exist, and (iv) the man-
ufacturer eliminates the referral infomediary. Refer-
ral services are all on line, so in scenarios (ii), (iii),
and (iv), the retailers make some online sales in addi-
tion to sales ofﬂine. All sales are off line in scenario (i).
Without loss of generality, production costs are nor-
malized to zero.
Each consumer who visits a retailer off line imposes
an incremental price discovery cost, . This incremen-
tal cost includes items such as the cost of renting real
estate for a physical showroom, maintaining a sales
staff, and having display models for consumers to test
drive, as well as the opportunity cost of time spent in
providing product information, negotiation, and com-
pleting paperwork. Our results depend only on the
difference between ofﬂine and online discovery costs,
so the online cost is normalized to zero.
With respect to the auto industry, Scott-Morton
et al. (2001) show that the average cost to a speciﬁc
dealer of an ofﬂine sale is $635 higher than the cost of
a sale via Autobytel. Along the same lines, Ratchford
et al. (2003, p. 206) show that the Internet has led to a
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“considerable reduction in consumer time spent with
dealer/manufacturer sources, most of which is time
spent at the dealership requiring the presence of a
salesperson.” Dealers that handle a higher volume of
consumers need to employ more salespeople, have a
larger showroom, and maintain a larger ﬂeet for test
drives. Thus, discovery costs entail a substantial com-
ponent that varies with customer ﬂow. We model it
purely as a marginal cost that depends on the number
of consumers who walk in to a retailer, and we dis-
cuss the implications of a ﬁxed-cost component after
Propositions 3 and 4 below.
The referral infomediary chooses whether to enroll
one or both retailers and allows consumers to obtain
an online price quote from enrolled retailers. The info-
mediary charges a retailer a ﬁxed referral fee of K to
enroll. For example, infomediaries such as Autobytel.
com and Carpoint.com charge dealers an average
ﬁxed monthly fee of around $1,000, depending on
dealer size and sales (Moon 2000).
We focus on the role of the infomediary in provid-
ing information about prices to consumers. Of course,
infomediaries also provide an important service by
allowing consumers to access independent third-party
information about the quality or features of a prod-
uct. In this paper, we restrict attention to referral ser-
vices that allow consumers to obtain online prices, as
opposed to any other information about the product.
2.2. Consumers
The market consists of a unit mass of consumers. Con-
sumers are heterogeneous both in terms of their val-
uation and in their search behavior. A consumer’s
valuation for the merchandise is either high, V h, or
low, V l, where V h > V l > 0. The proportion of high-
valuation consumers is 
. Each consumer buys either
zero or one unit of the product.
Consumers also differ in their search behavior,
based on an implicit notion of search costs. There-
fore, different consumers may observe different sets
of prices. A consumer with valuation j buys if her net
utility is positive; i.e., V j − Pmin ≥ 0, where Pmin is the
minimum price offered to this consumer.
The focus of our paper is consumer search for the
price of a product. In the context of the auto industry,
the starting point in our analysis can be those con-
sumers who have already decided on a speciﬁc brand
and make of car and are now interested in searching
for prices for that particular vehicle.
We classify consumers into search segments, based
on the prices they observe. We consider three distinct
segments: (i) a proportion u of “uninformed” con-
sumers, who are less informed about different prices
and hence obtain a price from just one retailer; (ii) a
proportion p of “partially informed” consumers,
who obtain a price from one retailer and the refer-
ral infomediary (when it exists); and (iii) a proportion
1−u−p of “fully informed” consumers, who obtain
prices from both retailers as well as the referral info-
mediary. This is very similar to the consumer frame-
work used in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988).
Our uninformed segment captures both the notion
that some consumers engage in limited search be-
cause of high opportunity costs of time (see, e.g.,
Ratchford et al. 2003) and that some consumers are
loyal to a given retailer, perhaps because of satisfac-
tion from previous purchases.5 Thus, this segment of
consumers is “less informed” because the individuals
have a lower interest in acquiring information about
prices and choose to be aware of the price at one ﬁrm
only. For convenience, in comparison to other seg-
ments, we call them “uninformed.”
Informed consumers in our model are akin to
switchers who shop around for prices and ﬁnally
purchase from the retailer charging the lowest price.
These consumers are either partially informed (mod-
erate searchers who are interested in observing two
prices) or fully informed (extensive searchers who are
interested in observing all three prices).
In terms of empirical justiﬁcation from the auto
industry, Cattin and Punj (1983) and Pandraud et al.
(2005) demonstrate that a signiﬁcant proportion of
consumers are loyal to a single dealer. Using a data
set of auto purchases in Europe, Pandraud et al.
(2005) ﬁnd that 47%–79% of auto buyers visit only one
dealer. Klein and Ford (2003) show that 39% of auto-
mobile shoppers search for prices across two or fewer
dealers. Thus, there is ample empirical evidence to
suggest that some consumers receive only one price,
and others receive two or more prices.
5 Numerous other costs have been suggested that prevent con-
sumers from searching for prices, including costs of frustration
from, for example, dealing with incompetent salespersons (Downs
1961).
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We do not assume any correlation between con-
sumer valuations and search behavior. The empirical
evidence on this is mixed. On the one hand, higher-
income consumers are more likely to have access to
the Internet. However, they also have a high opportu-
nity cost of time and hence may not search as inten-
sively. For example, Klein and Ford (2003) show that
there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between an
auto buyer’s income and total time spent in search-
ing for prices. We later show (in §5) that this sort of
a correlation between search and valuation actually
emerges endogenously in our model, as a result of the
pricing strategies chosen by retailers.
When a consumer approaches a retailer for a price
quote, the retailer is unable to distinguish which
search segment a consumer belongs to. That is, either
off line or on line, a retailer cannot determine the set
of prices observed by a particular consumer. How-
ever, we assume that off line, the retailer is able
to determine the consumer’s valuation for the prod-
uct, whereas one disadvantage of online purchases
for the retailers is that they do not obtain informa-
tion about consumer valuations. For example, Scott-
Morton et al. (2003, 2006) mention that dealers in
ofﬂine channels use various cues to infer consumers’
willingness to pay; these cues are not easily available
online.
We make two assumptions throughout the paper.
First, we assume that 
 ≤ V l/V h, so that the pro-
portion of high-valuation consumers is not too high.
Otherwise, low-valuation consumers may be com-
pletely shut out of the market (for example, the man-
ufacturer may ﬁnd it optimal to set the wholesale
price W close to V h). Second, we assume that the dis-
covery cost  is sufﬁciently low to permit retailers
to earn a nonnegative gross proﬁt in each scenario.
Speciﬁcally, we require that  ≤ V l + u
V h − V l/
2−u.6
3. Ofﬂine World: No Referral
Services Exist
We now analyze each of the four scenarios mentioned,
starting with the case of no referral services. Each sce-
nario is described by a multistage game. We consider
6 Details behind this expression are provided in the proof of
Proposition 3.
Table 1 Prices Observed by Each Consumer Segment when No
Referral Service Exists
Types u/2 u/2 p/2 p/2 1− u− p
HV consumers P1V h	 P2V h	 P1V h	 P2V h	 P1V h	, P2V h	
LV consumers P1V l 	 P2V l 	 P1V l 	 P2V l 	 P1V l 	, P2V l 	
Note. HV= high-value; LV= low-value.
a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game in each
case and therefore analyze the game via backward
induction.
When neither the referral infomediary nor the man-
ufacturer referral service exist, the stages in the game
are as follows. In Stage 1, the manufacturer sets the
franchise fee, F , and the optimal wholesale price, W ,
for each retailer. In Stage 2, retailers simultaneously
choose retail prices P1V hP1V l and P2V h
P2V
l. In Stage 3, consumers decide which product
to buy.
Consider each of the three search segments:
(i) Uninformed consumers, of market size u, ob-
serve just one ofﬂine price from one retailer. We
assume these consumers are equally likely to visit D1
and D2.
(ii) Partially informed consumers, of size p, be-
have in exactly the same way as uninformed con-
sumers when there is no infomediary. Hence, these
consumers also visit D1 and D2 with equal probability.
(iii) Fully informed consumers, of size 1−u−p,
obtain prices from both retailers.
The prices observed by consumers in different mar-
ket segments are depicted in Table 1. In the ofﬂine
world, the retailers perfectly observe each consumer’s
valuation. Hence, the prices offered to consumers
depend on their valuations. As a result, this basic
model reduces to that of Varian (1980). Using sim-
ilar arguments as in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan
(1988), we can show that no pure-strategy equilibrium
exists in the subgame that starts at Stage 2. There is,
however, a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in
which both retailers have equal market shares and
offer randomly chosen prices to the consumers. Both
dealers adopt the same price distribution for each
consumer type, and each retailer has a market share
of one-half.7
7 The intuition behind this equilibrium is that there exists some
amount of dispersion in retailer prices across channels and also
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With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to the
proﬁt earned by retailers before they pay the franchise
fee F and (where applicable) the referral infomediary
fee K as their “gross proﬁt.” When there is no referral
service, the manufacturer optimally sets the franchise
fee F to extract the entire gross proﬁt of the retail-
ers. That is, in our model, all bargaining power rests
with the manufacturer. This is not a crucial assump-
tion. The model is robust to either retailers having
some bargaining power or retailers having a reserva-
tion proﬁt.8
The equilibrium in this case is described in the
following proposition. The proof of the proposition
(and all other results) is in the online appendix. In
Appendix A1 at the end of the paper, we provide
mathematical details of the pricing strategies, the
manufacturer’s franchise fee, and manufacturer and
channel proﬁts.
Proposition 1. (i) The manufacturer optimally sets
the wholesale price equal to the valuation of the low type
consumer.
(ii) In equilibrium, each retailer charges a price equal to
its valuation to low-type consumers and randomly chooses
a price for high-type consumers, such that on average these
consumers earn a surplus.
(iii) The manufacturer sets the franchise fee to extract
the entire gross proﬁt of the retailers, net of discovery cost.
(iv) The retailers make a zero proﬁt after paying the
franchise fee.
(v) Total proﬁt in the supply chain equals the man-
ufacturer’s proﬁt and increases as ofﬂine discovery cost
increases, the proportion of high-value consumers increases,
between retailers within a given channel. This may occur because
of intertemporal price discounts through rebates and promotions
offered to consumers by different auto dealers at different times.
Prior research has also interpreted such equilibrium strategies as
sales through the use of coupons or price promotions (Varian 1980).
8 If retailers have some bargaining power, either the Nash or the
Rubinstein bargaining approaches will imply that the gross proﬁt
earned by retailers is split between the manufacturer and the retail-
ers in some fashion, say in the proportion  for the manufacturer
and 1 − /2 to each retailer. When an infomediary is present,
it in turn claims a share of the total channel proﬁt. If retailers
have a reservation proﬁt R> 0, each retailer must earn R in equi-
librium, reducing the franchise fee by R and the manufacturer’s
proﬁt by 2R. Equilibrium strategies in the retailers’ subgame are
not affected if R is a ﬁxed quantity.
and the proportion of uninformed or partially informed
consumers increases.
Note that in our model, it is no longer optimal to
set the wholesale price equal to the manufacturer’s
marginal cost (zero). Setting a wholesale price below
V l leads to lower prices on an average, as retail-
ers ﬁnd themselves in ﬁerce competition. This price
reduction decreases proﬁts and thus leads to a reduc-
tion in the franchise fee. Conversely, setting a higher
wholesale price alleviates the extent of price com-
petition between downstream retailers in the supply
chain.
3.1. Correlated Search
Note that in the base model, the optimal pricing strat-
egy for high-valuation consumers depends on the
size of informed and uninformed segments. Suppose
the segments were endogenously determined by the
retailers by investing in some advertising or customer
acquisition strategies in a previous stage. This would
lead to the emergence of correlations between val-
uations and search behavior. Even if differences in
the search behavior of the low-valuation consumers
lead to difference in sizes of the segments, the nature
of the equilibrium remains unchanged. The low-
valuation consumers will be charged a price equal to
their valuations, and the prices for the high-valuation
consumers will be randomized. This is because the
optimal pricing strategies will only depend on the size
of the segments.
4. Model with Referral Infomediary
Now, consider the entry of a third-party referral info-
mediary that allows consumers to obtain prices from
the retailers it enrolls. The infomediary has the choice
of enrolling either one retailer (D2) or both (D1 andD2).
We ﬁrst show in this section that the infomediary earns
a zero proﬁt if it enrolls both retailers. Next, we show
that it earns a positive proﬁt if it enrolls just one
retailer.9 Further, such a choice also leads to a higher
proﬁt in the entire channel.
9 Trivially, the infomediary also has the option of enrolling zero
retailers, in which case it again earns a zero proﬁt.
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Table 2 Prices Observed by Each Consumer Segment If Infomediary Enrolls Both Retailers
Types u/2 u/2 p/2 p/2 1− u− p
HV consumers P1V h	 P2V h	 P r1 , P
r
2 , P1V
h	 P r1 , P
r
2 , P2V
h	 P1V
h	, P2V h	, P r1 , P
r
2
LV consumers P1V l 	 P2V l 	 P r1 , P
r
2 , P1V
l 	 P r1 , P
r
2 , P2V
l 	 P1V
l 	, P2V l 	, P r1 , P
1
2
4.1. Infomediary Enroll Both Retailers
First, suppose the infomediary enrolls both retailers.
Table 2 depicts the prices observed by each segment.
The uninformed segment, which does not use the
referral infomediary, sees only one price, as before.
Consumers in the partially informed segment see the
online referral prices from both the retailers, plus an
ofﬂine price from one retailer. Those who are fully
informed see all four prices (two ofﬂine and two
online).10
There are now four stages to the game. At Stage 1,
the manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F , and whole-
sale price, W . At Stage 2, the referral infomediary
sets a referral fee, K, and enrolls both dealers. At
Stage 3, retailers simultaneously choose ofﬂine and
online prices. Each retailer chooses P1V hP1V l for
ofﬂine consumers and P r1 P
r
2  for online consumers.
Note the difference with the model with no info-
mediary: Ofﬂine consumers still obtain a price that
depends on their valuation, but online consumers
receive a price independent of their valuation. At the
last stage, consumers decide which price to accept.
The crucial aspect of the search segmentation is that
there is no segment that sees just one referral price
but not the other (i.e., just Pr1 and not P
r
2 or vice versa).
The existence of a segment that sees only one refer-
ral price is critical to sustain equilibria with strictly
positive proﬁts (see, e.g., Varian 1980 or Narasimhan
1988). In the absence of such a segment, the referral
prices are set as they would be in Bertrand competi-
tion, i.e., to marginal cost W .11
Therefore, all consumers in the partially informed
and fully informed segments buy at the referral price,
W , and retailers earn zero proﬁt from such sales.
10 The online referral price is committed to the customers before
they come into the physical stores. This prevents the dealer from
changing the committed price once he meets with the customer in
the ofﬂine channel, even though dealers can infer their valuations.
11 Note that the analysis is unchanged if the entire group of partially
informed consumers visits only one retailer, either D1 or D2.
In turn, they choose ofﬂine prices to maximize their
proﬁt from the uninformed segment by charging V h
to high-valuation consumers and V l to low-valuation
ones.12
Because retailers earn zero proﬁt from infomediary-
referred sales, they can earn exactly the same proﬁt
by not enrolling with the infomediary and making
no sales in the partially informed and fully informed
segments. As a result, the maximal referral fee the
infomediary can charge is zero.
Proposition 2. Suppose the infomediary enrolls both
retailers. Then it must set the referral fee to zero, so that
it makes a zero proﬁt. In equilibrium in the retailers’ pric-
ing game, the retailers set the referral prices equal to the
wholesale price and set ofﬂine prices equal to consumer
valuations.
Hence, if it enrolls both retailers, the infomediary
earns a zero proﬁt. We show next that it earns a pos-
itive proﬁt if it enrolls only one retailer. Hence, in
equilibrium, the infomediary strictly prefers to enroll
only one retailer.
4.1.1. Correlated Search. Suppose we consider
the scenario in which, because of investments made
by retailers in a preceding stage, the correlations
between search behavior and valuations are endoge-
nously determined.13 Because ofﬂine search behavior
is typically driven by the opportunity cost of time,
and the online search behavior is driven by access to
the Internet, the high-valuation consumers will search
on line and the low-valuation consumers will search
off line. Our analysis reveals that in equilibrium, the
online referral prices are still set to the wholesale
12 This provides one contrast between our model and that of Chen
et al. (2002), who also show that an infomediary will enroll only
one dealer. In their model, a positive proﬁt equilibrium with price
dispersion obtains even if both dealers are enrolled.
13 We thank the Senior Editor and an anonymous referee for recom-
mending this analysis.
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price, W , but the ofﬂine prices are set equal to con-
sumer valuations. The table depicting the price search
behavior is given in the online appendix (see Table 5).
4.2. Infomediary Enrolls Only One Retailer
Suppose the retailer enrolls only D2 and enables par-
tially and fully informed consumers to obtain an
online price from this retailer. The sequence of the
game stays the same as before.
As before, uninformed consumers obtain just one
ofﬂine price and visit the two retailers in equal
proportion. Partially informed consumers obtain an
online price from D2 and an ofﬂine price from D1.14
Fully informed consumers obtain an ofﬂine price from
each retailer, as well as an online price from D2. The
prices observed by consumers in different market seg-
ments are depicted in Table 3.
Retailers are now asymmetric in terms of the num-
ber of consumers who observe their prices. This
model, therefore, builds on Narasimhan (1988), who
considers asymmetric ﬁrms. Further, D2 can now
quote more than one price to consumers in the fully
informed segment, allowing for price discrimination
across segments.
Given that 
≤ V l/V h, it is not optimal for the man-
ufacturer to charge a wholesale price W >V l. At such
a price, the low-valuation consumers will be shut out
of the market (since retailers will charge a price no
lower than W ). Hence, consider the choice of W in
the region 0V l. The equilibrium here depends on
whether the manufacturer chooses a low wholesale
price (closer to zero) or a high one (closer to V l).
A low wholesale price leads to low retail prices and
a lower proﬁt for the manufacturer.
Therefore, for ease of comparison throughout the
paper, we consider the choice among prices sufﬁ-
ciently close to V l. In particular, as we show in
Lemma 1 in the online appendix, there is a threshold
value of W (which we call W ) such that the equi-
librium strategies of the dealers for any wholesale
price W ∈  WV l can be described in terms of W .
This allows us to determine the optimal wholesale
price in this region. Because retailers are asymmetric
with respect to market coverage, the equilibrium here
14 Since their online price comes from D2, they visit D1 for an ofﬂine
price.
Table 3 Prices Observed by Each Consumer Segment when
Infomediary Enrolls Only One Retailer
Types u/2 u/2 p 1− u− p
HV consumers P1V h	 P2V h	 P1V h	, P r2 P1V
h	, P2V h	, P r2
LV consumers P1V l 	 P2V l 	 P1V l 	, P r2 P1V
l 	, P2V l 	, P r2
follows the lines of the equilibrium in Narasimhan
(1988). As before, no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
The details of the equilibrium are contained in
Lemma 1 in the online appendix.
Intuitively, the entry of the referral infomediary
leads to an increase in competition between the two
retailers. Retailer D2 uses the infomediary as a price-
discriminating mechanism. Essentially, D2 now has
two weapons: It uses its online referral price to com-
pete with D1 and the ofﬂine prices to capture the
entire consumer surplus from its captive uninformed
segment. The online infomediary referral price, Pr2 , is
therefore used to discriminate between uninformed
and informed consumers.
The retailer that is not enrolled with the infome-
diary D1 makes all its sales at its physical store. D2
makes some online sales at the referral price, Pr2 , in
the partially and fully informed segments and some
ofﬂine sales to the low-valuation consumers in these
two segments. It also makes some sales to uninformed
consumers at its physical store. Sales made through
the online referral mechanism incur no discovery cost.
However, for every customer who walks in at the
physical stores, retailers incur a discovery cost of .
The gross proﬁt of D2 (i.e., without accounting for
the franchise and referral fees) is higher than that of
D1 for two reasons: (i) Its discovery costs decrease
because some consumers shift on line, and (ii) its abil-
ity to price discriminate improves, and it can charge
a monopoly price to the uninformed segment.
We use the superscript I to indicate the values of
various quantities for the case in which only the info-
mediary referral service is available. In equilibrium,
the manufacturer will set its franchise fee, F I , equal
to the lower of the two gross proﬁts, that is, the
expected gross proﬁt of D1. The optimal referral fee
charged by the infomediary will be the difference in
expected gross proﬁt between D2 and D1.15 As a result
15 We assume that the entire bargaining power in the negotia-
tion between the infomediary and D2 rests with the infomediary.
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of the enhanced price discrimination ability and the
reduction in discovery costs it offers, the infomediary
earns a positive proﬁt. Therefore, the infomediary will
strictly prefer to enroll only one retailer.16
We show that, if the number of partially informed
consumers is low, or the proportion of high-valuation
consumers is not too low, the optimal wholesale price
of the manufacturer is WI = V l. The mathematical
details of pricing strategies, manufacturer and info-
mediary fees, and proﬁts of various parties are con-
tained in Appendix A1 at the end of this paper.
Proposition 3. Suppose the proportion of partially in-
formed consumers is not too high, or the proportion of
high-valuation consumers is not too low, so that 1−u−
2p1−
 > 0. Then,
(i) The optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer
equals the valuation of the low-type consumer.
(ii) The optimal franchise fee is lower than in the ofﬂine
case. The manufacturer’s proﬁt unambiguously falls as a
result of the infomediary.
(iii) The optimal infomediary referral fee increases in
the proportion of high-valuation consumers, the proportion
of partially informed consumers, and the ofﬂine discovery
cost.
(iv) Each retailer earns a zero proﬁt.
(v) Total channel proﬁt is higher than in the ofﬂine case
if the proportion of partially informed consumers is sufﬁ-
ciently low.
Next, we comment on the effects of our assump-
tions on consumer search behavior and discovery cost
on the above result.
Remark 1.
• Consumer search behavior: In our base model,
the partially informed segment p consists of moder-
ate searchers. As a result of high search costs, these
consumers obtain only an online price from the refer-
ral infomediary and an ofﬂine price from D1. What
are the implications of these consumers also obtain-
ing an ofﬂine price from D2? If they did, they would
be equivalent to fully informed consumers. In such
As with the discussion in §3 earlier, this assumption is easily mod-
iﬁed to allow D2 to capture some of the increase in its gross proﬁt
created by the infomediary.
16 In practice, too, it is common for an infomediary to assign exclu-
sive geographic territories to auto dealers; for example, see Moon
(2000) and Scott-Morton et al. (2001, 2006).
a scenario, we will have two distinct consumer seg-
ments: an uninformed segment of size (u) and a
fully informed segment of size (1−u). We can deter-
mine the effects of such a change by setting p = 0 in
the equilibrium expressions for the ﬁrst two cases in
Appendix A1.
Note that the condition in Proposition 3 is immedi-
ately satisﬁed when p = 0, so that the optimal whole-
sale price charged by the manufacturer remains V l.
If p = 0, we further have F I = F o; that is, the fran-
chise fee charged by the manufacturer remains the
same even when the infomediary is present. Since the
wholesale price remains V l, the manufacturer’s proﬁt
remains the same as in the ofﬂine case, with I =o.
Total channel proﬁts increase by the infomediary’s
rent, u1−u/2−uV h−V l.
• Zero discovery cost: Suppose the discovery cost 
were zero. The intuition of the model remains very
similar, as can be seen by substituting = 0 into the
equilibrium expressions in Appendix A1. In particu-
lar, the infomediary makes a positive proﬁt, the man-
ufacturer’s proﬁt is reduced, and total channel proﬁt
may be higher or lower, depending on the size of the
partially informed segment.
• Fixed discovery cost: One may imagine that re-
tailers incur some ﬁxed costs in addition to the
marginal costs of customer discovery. Our results are
qualitatively unchanged with the inclusion of ﬁxed
discovery costs for retailers: The manufacturer’s fran-
chise fee decreases when the infomediary enters. The
driving factor is that the manufacturer sets the fran-
chise fee equal to the lower of the two retailer proﬁts,
and the infomediary captures the difference in their
proﬁts. Quantitatively, there will be a reduction in the
franchise and referral fees by a total amount equiv-
alent to the ﬁxed cost of each retailer. Essentially, a
ﬁxed discovery cost has a similar effect as a reserva-
tion proﬁt for a retailer.
• Correlated search: Suppose, as before, that lim-
ited Internet access and awareness leads to only high-
valuation consumers searching in the online channel.
In such a case where correlations between search
behavior and valuations are endogenously deter-
mined, our analysis reveals that the online referral
price is naturally set to target the high-valuation con-
sumers. Consequently, as before, the referral price is
randomized between V h and V l. Thus, even if none
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of the low-valuation consumers search online, we ﬁnd
that it is still optimal for the retailer to use the referral
service as the perfect screening mechanism. Moreover,
our model can also be generalized to incorporate the
situation where some low-valuation consumers in the
partially and fully informed segments search online.
Our analysis reveals that the nature of the equilibrium
and the results remain unchanged. The table depict-
ing the price search behavior is given in the online
appendix.
We next discuss the importance of the condition
1− u − 2p1− 
 > 0 in the statement of Proposi-
tion 3. In the absence of the infomediary, by always
setting the wholesale price at V l, the manufacturer is
able to prevent aggravated price competition between
the downstream retailers. When W = V l, there is
no price dispersion between the two dealers’ prices
for the low-valuation customers. Although this phe-
nomenon still occurs in the presence of the infome-
diary, the wholesale price is set to V l only if the
proportion of partially informed consumers or that of
low-valuation consumers is low. For instance, for any
1 − 
 ≤ 05, the optimality of this wholesale price
will hold. Similarly, the condition holds for 
 < 05 if
the number of fully informed customers outnumbers
the number of partially informed customers.
Suppose the manufacturer chooses a wholesale
price W <V l. As shown in Lemma 1 (which is in the
online appendix), if the size of the partially informed
segment (p) increases, D1 offers a higher price on
average to ofﬂine low-valuation consumers. This in
turn allows the manufacturer to increase the franchise
fee. If there are enough partially informed consumers,
the gains from thus increasing the franchise fee can
outweigh the losses from a lower wholesale price, to
the extent that the manufacturer ﬁnds it optimal to
set W <V l.
In sum, the entry of the infomediary leads to an
increase in the gross proﬁt of the enrolled retailer and
a corresponding decrease in the gross proﬁt of the
other retailer. This in turn leads to a lower franchise
fee and a decrease in the manufacturer’s proﬁts.
5. Manufacturer Establishes
a Referral Service
Next, we consider the scenario in which the manufac-
turer sets up its own digitally enabled referral service.
We assume that the manufacturer enrolls both retail-
ers. This reconciles well with practice: Manufacturers
such as General Motors (GM) Nissan, and Ford fol-
low a nonexclusive strategy of enrolling retailers in
their respective referral services, GMbuypower.com,
Nissandriven.com, and Forddirect.com.17 As before,
we only consider the case of the infomediary enrolling
one retailer, D2. If the infomediary enrolls both retail-
ers, the logic of the infomediary-only case goes
through, and the retailers earns zero proﬁt. Hence, the
infomediary will not enroll both retailers.
In each of the previous search segments, a propor-
tion  of the consumers (the “physical segment”) con-
tinues to visit the physical stores, and the remaining
proportion, 1 −  (the “Web segment”), goes to the
corresponding retailer via the manufacturer referral
website.
The stages in this game are as follows: At Stage 1,
the manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F , and the
wholesale price, W , and establishes a referral website.
Next, at Stage 2, the referral infomediary enrolls D2
and sets a referral fee, K. At Stage 3, retailers simulta-
neously choose prices. D1 chooses P1V hP1V l for
ofﬂine consumers and Pm1 for online consumers who
come through the manufacturer website. D2 chooses
P2V
hP2V
l for ofﬂine consumers Pm2 for online
consumers who come via the manufacturer website,
and Pr2 for online consumers who come via the refer-
ral infomediary. In the ﬁnal stage, consumers decide
which product to buy.
We allow the manufacturer to move ﬁrst to capture
the notion that it has signiﬁcant market power and
can establish its franchise fee to capture rents from
the retailers. The infomediary has less market power
and is, in a sense, the residual claimant on the proﬁt
of D2. The prices seen by consumers in different mar-
ket segments are shown in Table 4.
Each retailer continues to observe the type of con-
sumer at the physical store (i.e., in each of the four
subsegments of the physical segment ) and can
quote a price to these consumers that depends on
17 Clicking on the link to ﬁnd a dealership on these websites yields
multiple dealer options, all with e-mail and/or phone contacts. In
§8.3, we highlight why the manufacturer is content enrolling both
retailers rather than just enrolling D1 (the retailer not enrolled with
the infomediary).
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Table 4 Different Prices Observed by Each Consumer Segment
Types u/2 1− 	u/2 u/2 1− 	u/2 p 1− 	p 1− u− p	 1− 	1− u− p	
V h P1V
h	 P m1 P2V
h	 P m2 P1V
h	, P r2 P
m
1 , P
r
2 P1V
h	, P2V h	, P r2 P
m
1 , P
m
2 , P
r
2
V l P1V
l 	 P m1 P2V
l 	 P m2 P1V
l 	, P r2 P
m
2 , P
r
2 P1V
l 	, P2V l 	, P r2 P
m
1 , P
m
2 , P
r
2
their type. However, as before, the retailers do not
observe the types of the consumers who come via
the manufacturer website. Hence, in the Web (1− )
sub-segments, a given retailer must quote the same
prices to both consumer types. We denote the online
(manufacturer referral) prices of the two retailers as
Pm1 and P
m
2 .
In Lemma 1 in the online appendix, we exhibit the
equilibrium prices and retailer gross proﬁt when the
wholesale price W is close to V l. As before, at lower
wholesale prices, the manufacturer proﬁt is lower, too.
In equilibrium, the price D2 offers to consumers who
use the infomediary, Pr2 , follows the same distribution
as in the world with only an infomediary and no man-
ufacturer referrals. Consider the extreme case with
only Web consumers (i.e., = 0). The structure of the
game is then similar to the one with only an infomedi-
ary referral service. However, because all consumers
here are on line, no information about consumer val-
uations is available. Because the proportion of high-
valuation consumers is low (recall that 
 ≤ V l/V h),
both retailers act as if all consumers had low val-
uations and randomize referral prices with a high-
est price of V l. Hence, the price distribution function
remains the same as with only the infomediary refer-
ral service.
This property then helps determine the rest of the
equilibrium strategies. In particular, given the struc-
ture of the new game, it implies that the prices
P1V
lP1V
hP2V
l, and P2V h are set as in the ear-
lier game in §4. Finally, Pm1 is chosen randomly over
an interval as well. The equilibrium exhibited below
holds for all values of  ∈ 01. Note that if  = 1,
we are back to the game of Table 3, and the equi-
librium strategies are equivalent to those for the case
in which only the infomediary referral service exists,
as exhibited in Lemma 1 (which is part of the online
appendix).
Intuitively, D2 charges an infomediary referral price
randomly chosen over the interval W + uV h −
W/2 − uV h and charges a higher price V h to
referrals from the manufacturer’s website. Because
all partially and fully informed consumers who
approach D2 through the manufacturer site also seek a
price via the infomediary, D2 is effectively able to use
the infomediary referral price as a price discrimina-
tion tool, to separate out informed consumers, while it
charges the maximum feasible price V h to Web-based
uninformed consumers. Similarly, D1 charges prices
higher than V l to Web-based consumers, effectively
shutting out low-valuation consumers from buying
over the Web.
Online referral services effectively serve as a price
discrimination tool for retailers. Although informa-
tion about consumer valuations is unavailable on line,
retailers are able to screen out low-valuation con-
sumers and sell only to high-valuation consumers
in the online channel. Therefore, despite making no
assumption about correlation between online search
behavior and consumer valuations, our model implies
that online purchases and consumer valuations are
indeed correlated, because only high-valuation con-
sumers buy on line.18
What wholesale price will the manufacturer charge?
We show that if the proportion of consumers who
remain ofﬂine, , and the proportion of high-valuation
consumers, 
, is sufﬁciently high, the manufacturer
will again charge the wholesale price V l. Intuitively,
when the manufacturer chooses a higher wholesale
price, the equilibrium of the retailers’ pricing game
leads to manufacturer referral prices greater than V l.
Consequently, uninformed low-valuation buyers in
the Web segment, who only check online manufac-
turer referral prices, are shut out of the market, and
18 Note that our model predicts that, on average, online searchers
(not necessarily online buyers) pay lower prices. Online buyers
have high valuation and obtain lower prices than ofﬂine high-
valuation customers but higher prices than ofﬂine low-valuation
customers. For some model parameters, the average online price
will be lower than the average ofﬂine price (e.g., if the proportion
of online consumers is relatively low).
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the manufacturer’s total sales fall. The cost of losing
these consumers is lower if  is lower (so there are
fewer consumers in this subsegment) or 
 is higher
(so there are fewer low-valuation consumers). Thus,
as  declines toward zero, both manufacturer proﬁt
and total proﬁt in the supply chain increase. The
mathematical details of all relevant expressions are
shown in Appendix A1 at the end of the paper.
Proposition 4. Suppose the proportion of partially in-
formed consumers is not too high, and the proportion of
high-type consumers is not too low, so that 
1− u+
1−
1−u− 2p > 0. Then,
(i) The optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer
equals the valuation of the low-type consumer.
(ii) The optimal franchise fee is higher than in the info-
mediary case. Moreover, if the discovery cost is sufﬁciently
high, the manufacturer earns a higher proﬁt once it estab-
lishes its own referral service.
(iii) The optimal infomediary referral fee decreases com-
pared to the case when there is only an infomediary in the
market.
(iv) Each retailer earns a zero proﬁt.
(v) If the ofﬂine discover cost is sufﬁciently high, total
channel proﬁt is higher than in the infomediary-only case.
Intuitively, the impetus toward an increased manu-
facturer proﬁt comes from two sources. First, it levels
the playing ﬁeld between the two retailers by provid-
ing D1 with a weapon to price discriminate between
consumer segments online. Using the manufacturer’s
referral price Pm1 , D1 is now able to compete more
effectively against D2’s infomediary referral price Pr2
for the partially and fully informed consumer seg-
ments. Second, there is a reduction in the discovery
costs of D1 as some consumers are served online. This
increases proﬁt in the supply chain and enables the
manufacturer to extract this increased proﬁt via an
increase in the franchise fee that it charges the retail-
ers. Because eventual proﬁts of each retailer are non-
negative, there is no conﬂict of interest here between
supply chain members. Thus, the strategic decision by
the manufacturer to adopt a digitally enabled referral
service affects both the level of proﬁt in the supply
chain and the allocation of proﬁt among the members.
Next, we consider the effects of different consumer
search behavior and discovery cost on the above
equilibrium.
Remark 2.
• Consumer search behavior: Suppose consumers
in the p segment observed prices from both dealers,
in addition to receiving a price via the infomediary
referral service. This would be equivalent to a model
in which p = 0; that is, there would be no partially
informed segment. From the equilibrium expressions
in Appendix A1, we observe that when p = 0, the
manufacturer earns a higher proﬁt as a result of its
own website (i.e., m >I ). However, (i) the infome-
diary’s proﬁt is the same as before, with Km = KI ,
and (ii) as mentioned in Remark 1, the manufacturer’s
proﬁt when just the infomediary referral service exists
is the same as its ofﬂine proﬁt, because I =o. Note
that, as with Proposition 3, the condition in Propo-
sition 4 is immediately satisﬁed when p = 0, so the
optimal wholesale price charged by the manufacturer
remains V l.
• Discovery cost: The discovery cost  is clearly
critical in establishing that the manufacturer gains
when it sets up its own referral service (if = 0, then
m < I ). In the absence of a discovery cost, hav-
ing consumers search the online channels provides no
beneﬁts to the manufacturer and conversely does not
hurt the retailer. Thus, we see that the ability of deal-
ers to discriminate on prices as a result of the market
segmentation is critical to the success of the infome-
diary, whereas reducing the acquisition cost is critical
to the success of the manufacturer.
• Correlated search: Suppose, as before, limited
Internet access and awareness lead to only high-
valuation consumers searching in the online channel.
Once again, our analysis reveals no change in the
qualitative nature of the results and analysis.
There are three key aspects of the manufacturer’s
own referral service. First, the condition in the state-
ment of the Proposition 4, 
1−u+1−
1−u−
2p > 0, is satisﬁed whenever the size of the partially
informed segment is sufﬁciently low (i.e., when p is
close to zero) or whenever the proportion of high-
valuation consumers is not too low. Further, if = 1,
this condition reduces to the corresponding condition
for the infomediary-only case: 1−u−2p1−
 > 0.
Second, the trade-off for a manufacturer is that, al-
though discovery costs in the channel are reduced as a
result of its referral service, so are total sales. Because
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retailers use online referral services to shut out low-
valuation consumers, these consumers leave the chan-
nel altogether. Thus, total sales of the manufacturer
are lower than in the previous cases. To ensure that
the manufacturer earns a higher proﬁt after estab-
lishing its own referral service, the number of such
online low-valuation consumers must be sufﬁciently
low (i.e., the proportion of ofﬂine consumers, , must
be sufﬁciently high).
Third, compared to the infomediary-only case, the
manufacturer improves its proﬁt by establishing its
own referral services, in part by diverting proﬁt away
from the infomediary. This is demonstrated by the
existence of a range of discovery cost  for which
channel proﬁt decreases once the manufacturer refer-
ral service is set up, but the manufacturer’s proﬁt
increases. Thus, the referral service plays a strategic
role in the manufacturer’s response to the existence
of an infomediary.
Proposition 5. (i) The establishment of the referral
service leads to the optimal wholesale price being high (i.e.,
at least as high as the valuation of the low-type consumer)
over a larger range of parameter values.
(ii) Over some range of discovery cost, channel proﬁt
decreases, but manufacturer proﬁt increases because of the
manufacturer referral service.
Thus, the establishment of a referral service by the
manufacturer permits a wider leeway to set a high
wholesale price. The ﬂexibility in setting the whole-
sale price accrues from the heterogeneity in consumer
valuations. If all consumers were homogeneous in
their valuations, the manufacturer’s proﬁt-maximiz-
ing wholesale price would be equal across the dif-
ferent scenarios (regardless of the presence of the
infomediary).
Next, we consider the effects of the manufacturer
referral services on the expected sales, prices, and
proﬁts of the two retailers. Given the structure of the
equilibrium, the corresponding values for the physi-
cal segment are the same as in the infomediary-only
case. We show below that, in the Web segment, D2
(enrolled with the infomediary) has higher expected
sales than D1 (which is not enrolled with the infome-
diary). D2 uses the infomediary as a price discrimina-
tion mechanism. It charges (on average) a low price
to consumers referred by the infomediary and a high
price V h to consumers referred by the manufacturer.
Proposition 6. (i) In the Web segment, D2 (which is
enrolled with the infomediary) has higher expected sales
than D1 (which is not).
(ii) The average manufacturer referral price of D2 is
greater than its average infomediary referral price.
Using numerical analysis, we can show that there
is a large region in the parameter space wherein D1’s
manufacturer referral price is higher than D2’s info-
mediary referral price. The difference between the
manufacturer and infomediary referral prices in our
model is consistent with empirical evidence found by
Scott-Morton et al. (2006) for the auto industry. They
ﬁnd that while the referral process of third-party info-
mediaries helps consumers get lower prices, a referral
from a manufacturer website to one of the manufac-
turer’s dealerships results in higher prices.
In the ofﬂine segment, the market shares of the two
retailers remain the same as in the world with an
infomediary but no manufacturer referrals. That is, D2
retains a higher market share in the ofﬂine segment.
In the Web segments, we see that D2 again experiences
a higher market share. Hence, there is a strong incen-
tive for D2 (or more generally, for any one retailer)
to enroll with the infomediary. An afﬁliation with
the referral infomediary provides the retailer with the
ability to price discriminate in its uninformed (cap-
tive) segment. It charges a monopoly price to all
ofﬂine consumers and uses the referral price to com-
pete with the other retailer online. This increases its
expected sales. Conversely, the retailer who remains
out of the infomediary referral services incurs a loss
in expected sales and proﬁts.
6. Manufacturer Eliminates
the Referral Infomediary
As shown earlier, the manufacturer is hurt (i.e., it
has a lower proﬁt) by the presence of the infomedi-
ary. We show in this section that it is feasible for the
manufacturer to choose a wholesale price that would
eliminate the referral infomediary altogether. How-
ever, this is prohibitively costly for the manufacturer,
which prefers to allow the infomediary to remain in
the supply chain. In the context of the auto indus-
try, there is no evidence (anecdotal or otherwise) of
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an OEM attempting to eliminate a third-party referral
infomediary.19
Recall that the beneﬁt to a retailer of enrolling with
the infomediary is twofold: enhanced price discrimi-
nation and reduction in discovery cost. If the manu-
facturer wishes to eliminate the referral infomediary,
it must set a wholesale price W equal to V h. Any
wholesale price below V h leads to price dispersion,
which will facilitate price discrimination by D2, the
retailer enrolled with the infomediary. In turn, this
leads to a positive proﬁt for D2 after paying the man-
ufacturer’s franchise fee, and the infomediary can
extract this proﬁt through its referral fee. This pre-
vents the infomediary from unraveling.
On the other hand, if W = V h, each retailer must
set both ofﬂine and online prices equal to V h. A retail
price below V h leads to a loss on each sale, whereas
setting a retail price above V h leads to no sales at
all. When retail prices are set to V h, low-valuation
consumers are completely shut out of the market,
and only high-valuation consumers buy. Thus, total
sales are equal to 
. Further, total discovery costs are
2−u. Thus, the manufacturer’s overall proﬁt is

V h − 2− u. We show that if the proportion of
ofﬂine consumers is not too low, the manufacturer
has a higher proﬁt when it allows the infomediary to
coexist.
Proposition 7. Suppose the proportion of ofﬂine con-
sumers is not too low; speciﬁcally,  ≥ 1 − u
/1 −

 V h−V l/V l. Then the manufacturer has a lower proﬁt
if it eliminates the infomediary than if it allows the info-
mediary to coexist in the supply chain.
The condition in the proposition is also satisﬁed if
the proportion of high-valuation consumers, 
, is suf-
ﬁciently low. The intuition is that, to eliminate the
infomediary, the manufacturer must set the whole-
sale price to V h, which eliminates all low-valuation
consumers. With the manufacturer’s referral service,
online low-valuation consumers in the 1− seg-
ment are already eliminated, because online prices
19 There have been attempts by auto manufacturers to forge
strategic tie-ups with independent intermediaries. In 2001, GM
attempted an alliance with Autobytel and Ford with MSN Car-
point (now known as MSN Autos). Both attempts were abandoned
within a few months, with the OEMs instead building their own
referral services.
exceed V l. Thus, the incremental cost of setting
W = V h is that ofﬂine low-valuation consumers also
leave the market. This cost is naturally higher when
the proportion of ofﬂine consumers is higher or the
proportion of high-valuation consumers is lower.
Note that we do not consider scenarios in which the
manufacturer charges a different franchise fee for each
retailer. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits manu-
facturers from discriminating across symmetric retail-
ers. However, if there were some inherent asymmetry
between the retailers, such as differences in cost struc-
tures, it is possible the manufacturer would charge
different franchise fees to each retailer. One conse-
quence of such an action could be the unraveling of
the infomediary.
7. Numerical Corroboration with
Empirical Evidence
We now show that our model generates quantitative
results in accordance with anecdotal evidence. We
do this by choosing parameter values from previous
empirical literature and assessing the resulting price
dispersion and the implied closing ratios (CRs) for
retailer sales.
First, consider the sizes of the different market seg-
ments. Klein and Ford (2003) in their survey of auto
buyers point out that about 58% of consumers do not
search at all. Additionally, about 22% of the buyers
exhibit moderate search behavior by searching some
of the ofﬂine and online sources, and about 20% are
highly active information seekers who obtain multi-
ple quotes from all possible sources. This sort of con-
sumer search behavior is corroborated by a J.D. Pow-
ers study (2000), which ﬁnds that about 41% of con-
sumers surveyed used a referral service while buying
a car, whereas the remaining 59% did not (Rayport
et al. 1998). Based on these data sources, we vary the
value of u, the size of the uninformed segment in our
model, from 0 to 0.5. Further, Ratchford et al. (2003)
ﬁnd that 40% of buyers used online sources (i.e., man-
ufacturer and third-party websites). Based on this we
vary the proportion of ofﬂine consumers, , from 0.6
to 1. We vary the proportion of high-valuation buy-
ers, 
, from 0 to 0.4. Based on actual average gross
margin of dealers (see Moon 2000), we take V h−W
to be $3500 and V l−W to be $1500.
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Using these ranges for the parameters, we compute
the price dispersion between online and ofﬂine price,
the infomediary referral fee, and CRs. We choose u ∈
005 and determine the critical value of discovery
cost, c. If the actual discovery cost, , lies above this
threshold, the manufacturer’s proﬁt increases after the
manufacturer establishes its own referral service. We
ﬁnd that the maximal c over this parameter range is
$700. This is close to the empirical estimates of Scott-
Morton et al. (2001), who show that the average cost
to a dealer of an ofﬂine sale is $675 higher than the
cost of a sale via Autobytel.
Next we consider the price differences between
ofﬂine and online channels. Scott-Morton et al. (2001,
2003) show that the average Autobytel customer sees
a contract price about $500 lower than the nonrefer-
ral ofﬂine prices. For the parameters we consider, the
difference between the expected ofﬂine price (for low
types) and the expected online infomediary referral
price quotes (for D2, the retailer associated with the
infomediary) ranges between $400 and $650.
Finally, we numerically estimate the CRs of the
referral services. The CR is deﬁned as
CR= Number of units sold
Number of referrals received

This statistic forms a pivotal basis on which a retailer
is evaluated by the referral infomediary. For example,
in 1998–1999, Autobytel dropped around 250 dealers
(10% of its dealer base) because of negative customer
feedback and low CRs (see Moon 2000). We ﬁnd that
the CR of D2 via manufacturer referral services ranges
between 10% and 30%. According to anecdotal evi-
dence, Forddirect.com has a CR of 17%, and GMBuy-
power.com has a CR of around 25%.20 Between May
and October, 2001, GM tested a system of provid-
ing sales leads or referrals to Chevrolet dealers in
the Washington, D.C., area. According to GM, about
25% of such referrals were closed, which was roughly
the same proportion as that of walk-in leads closed
in physical showrooms. The numerical parameteriza-
tion, therefore, highlights the robustness of the model
and the main results. The CR from the infomediary
referral price in our model is between 20% and 30%,
20 www.trilogy.com/Sections/Industries/Automotive/Customers/
FordDirect-Success-Story.cfm.
slightly higher than industry evidence.21 One reason
for this may be that our model does not consider
interbrand competition. If consumers search among
multiple brands before completing a purchase, there
will be multiple referrals for a single sale, thereby
resulting in lower CRs.
8. Extensions
Because online markets are complex and rapidly evol-
ving, several extensions of our model merit further
discussions. In this section, we consider the robust-
ness of our model to changes in several of its features.
8.1. Manufacturer-Induced Online Price
Discrimination
Suppose an alternate online technology is available
whereby manufacturers can facilitate online price dis-
crimination by retailers.22 As shown in §5, retailers
lose information about consumer valuations on line
and charge online prices higher than V l. As a result,
online low-valuation consumers of mass 1−1−

are shut out of the market. If, say, D1 could identify
these consumers on line and set a price Pm1 equal to
their valuation V l, its overall sales would increase.
Though the dealer’s gross proﬁt would be unchanged
(because the marginal cost of the good to the dealer
is also V l), manufacturer and supply chain proﬁt
would increase by an amount of 1−1−
V l. This
increase would accrue from the per unit fee compo-
nent of the two-part tariff. Thus, online price discrim-
ination induced by the manufacturer can lead to even
greater proﬁts than those attainable in the benchmark
case.
8.2. Imperfect Information About Consumer
Valuations
For analytical tractability, we have assumed that, in
the ofﬂine channel, retailers can perfectly infer con-
sumer valuations. An alternative is to assume that
retailers observe the valuation with noise. There are
21 http://www.investorville.com/ubb/Forum2/HTML/000040.html.
22 If competing retailers are also differentiated on customer service
(as auto dealers often are), the interplay between price discrim-
ination and customer service can affect their incentives to adopt
personalized pricing policies. See, for example, Choudhary et al.
(2005).
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two possibilities in such a situation: First, if con-
sumers cannot bargain, sometimes the price will be
set above the valuation of a low-valuation consumer
(note that the price will never exceed the valuation
of a high-valuation consumer). Hence, low-valuation
consumers will sometimes choose to not purchase,
because they may be offered prices by both retailers in
excess of their valuations. This will reduce the gross
proﬁt of the retailers a little and thereby reduce the
manufacturer’s franchise fee.
However, several results of the paper will still go
through: (i) The infomediary will still enable price dis-
crimination across search segments and beneﬁt from
enrolling only one retailer, (ii) the manufacturer offer-
ing referral services will increase its proﬁts by extract-
ing surplus from the infomediary, and (iii) offering
its own referral services will allow the manufacturer
to set the wholesale price equal to the valuation
of the low-type consumers over a larger range of
parameters.
8.3. Manufacturer Enrolls Only One Retailer
One difference between manufacturer and infomedi-
ary referral services is that our manufacturer enrolls
both retailers. What if, instead, the manufacturer
enrolled only D1?23 We ﬁnd that the manufacturer is
equally well off enrolling only D1 as it is enrolling
both retailers. Our model hence provides a rationale
as to why manufacturers follow a nonexclusive prac-
tice of enrolling multiple retailers.
If D2 is not enrolled by the manufacturer, the only
segments affected are the uninformed (captive) seg-
ment of D2 and the fully informed consumers in the
 segment. The former clearly does not affect prof-
its of D1 in any way. Consider the latter. Recall that,
in our equilibrium, Pm2 is set to V
h, whereas Pm1 and
Pr2 are randomized over  	PhV h. Consequently, D1
effectively competes only with the infomediary refer-
ral price, Pr2 , and not with the manufacturer referral
price, Pm2 , of D2. Hence, D1’s sales to the latter seg-
ment are unchanged. Therefore, the proﬁts of D1 and
thus the manufacturer’s proﬁts are unchanged if only
D1 is enrolled.
23 It is trivial to show that enrolling only D2 leads to a further
decrease in D1’s proﬁts, and thus results in lower manufacturer
proﬁts.
However, such a move does affect D2’s gross prof-
its; these actually increase, because in its captive seg-
ment D2 can now sell to low-valuation consumers off
line at P2V l, rather than losing the online propor-
tion . This increase in D2’s gross proﬁt is then cap-
tured by the infomediary, providing the manufacturer
with a stronger incentive to decrease the infomedi-
ary’s channel power.
9. Conclusion and Limitations
Our analysis suggests that when manufacturers in
an extended enterprise cannot sell directly to con-
sumers, either because of legal restrictions or to avoid
direct conﬂict with their retailers, the digitally enabled
referral service model is a strategic tool for them to
increase their channel power and proﬁts. In particu-
lar, the referral mechanism, by diverting trafﬁc from
ofﬂine to online channels, both increases retailers’
ability to price discriminate across different consumer
search segments and leads to a reduction in customer
discovery costs. There is a trade-off, because retailers
have to forgo information about valuations of con-
sumers who only appear online.
Our model implies that the entry of third-party
referral services in the midstream part of an extended
enterprise can hurt manufacturers in both compo-
nents of its contract with downstream retailers—by
reducing its franchise fee and by squeezing its opti-
mal wholesale price. When a manufacturer establishes
its own online referral service, it counteracts both
effects. The extent to which overall supply chain prof-
its increase depends on the relative composition of
consumer types in the market and their valuations.
In practice, we expect the actual allocation of proﬁts
among supply chain members to vary, depending on
the bargaining power of each agent.
Interestingly, we derive consumer purchase behav-
ior endogenously, without assuming any relation-
ship between search behavior and valuations ex ante.
That is, based on the pricing strategies of retailers,
our model suggests that there will be an endogenous
correlation between purchases over the Web and con-
sumer valuations. Another implication of our model
is that in markets with relatively inelastic market
demand or high brand loyalty, the optimal wholesale
price can be higher than the manufacturer’s marginal
cost. Speciﬁcally, in the model, setting the wholesale
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price to the marginal cost instead of the valuation
of low-type consumers aggravates price competition
between downstream retailers, reducing the manufac-
turer’s franchise fee.
What are the implications of our paper for retail-
ers in an extended enterprise? In our model, we do
not consider the possibility of retailers establishing
their own Web services to attract consumer trafﬁc and
sales. Suppose each retailer sets up its own website to
directly appeal to consumers, in addition to enrolling
with the referral service. There are two potential
implications of such a phenomenon. Intuitively, one
consequence is an increase in the bargaining power
of the retailers vis-à-vis the manufacturer and info-
mediary, which will transfer some of the proﬁt in the
supply chain to the retailers. The qualitative nature of
our results holds under this formulation, though the
quantitative magnitudes of proﬁt change.
Another aspect of retailer websites is that these are
equivalent to an investment in customer acquisition,
similar to regular mass media advertising or market-
ing campaigns. In a model of price dispersion with
mixed strategies, Hann et al. (2005) show that if ﬁrms
invest in customer acquisition before setting prices,
the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is asymmetric,
with one ﬁrm acquiring twice as many customers as
the other. In our benchmark model this is equivalent
to having one retailer with a larger captive segment
of uninformed consumers and the other one having a
smaller captive segment. Potentially, this would affect
the incentives of each dealer to sign with the infome-
diary; the dealer with a smaller captive segment will
be more interested in the price discrimination pos-
sibilities offered by the infomediary. Again, such an
extension only affects the quantitative magnitudes of
prices, sales, and proﬁt in equilibrium, without chang-
ing the qualitative nature of the results.
Finally, our analysis suggests some strategies man-
ufacturers can adopt to maximize supply chain prof-
its. First, strategic alliances with online portals, such
as those of GM with AOL and Ford with Yahoo, can
direct a larger number of consumers to manufacturer-
sponsored referral services. Of course, infomediaries
will also beneﬁt from similar tie-ups. Because they
direct so much of online search, the major search
engines and portals can be expected to emerge as
important players in the referral services area. Sec-
ond, manufacturers can invest electronic customer
relationship management (e-CRM) packages to collect
more information about consumers who visit their
referral services to infer consumer valuations online.
Firms such as Nissan and GM are investing in tech-
nologies to enable such online personalized pricing
initiatives.
The restriction to a single manufacturer and a sin-
gle infomediary represents a limitation of our model.
In many instances, referral infomediaries partner with
multiple manufacturers. Interbrand competition or
price competition between infomediaries can impact
contracts between the different entities in the value
chain and hence the division of proﬁt across different
parts of the chain. Our conjecture is that the qualita-
tive nature of the results will remain unaffected, but it
would be interesting to formally model this scenario.
Another limitation is that we do not consider the
effect of infomediaries on the mix of buyers itself. Our
model assumes an exogenous demand from “unin-
formed” and “informed” customers whose market
sizes are driven by implicit differences in search costs.
The sizes of various market segments may well change
endogenously with the availability of competing third-
party infomediaries. For example, what would hap-
pen if there were a disproportionate representation of
one type of consumer in the online segments? Suppose
only high-valuation consumers searched on line. Then
our results would still hold, because online prices
are already targeted only toward high-valuation con-
sumers in our current model. On the other hand, if
only low-valuation consumers searched on line, online
prices would be lower, because high-valuation con-
sumers would have already screened themselves out
from accessing referral services. A detailed analysis of
these possibilities is beyond the scope of our paper but
can be a fruitful area for future research.
Finally, we do not allow consumers to bargain over
the price when they visit a physical retailer store. It
is possible that consumers who are partially and fully
informed choose to bargain, because they observe
multiple prices and will have an online price in hand
before they obtain an ofﬂine price. Once we allow
for such bargaining between consumers and retail-
ers in the supply chain, the online prices obtained
by even high-valuation consumers may be higher
Ghose, Mukhopadhyay, and Rajan: The Impact of Internet Referral Services on a Supply Chain
318 Information Systems Research 18(3), pp. 300–319, © 2007 INFORMS
than the ofﬂine prices obtained via bargaining. What-
ever price is charged online, a consumer will obtain a
lower ofﬂine price from the other dealer. Thus, no sales
occur via the infomediary, which can no longer exist.
Therefore, the existence of the infomediary necessarily
requires some imperfections in consumers’ bargaining
abilities.
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Appendix A1. Outcomes Under Different
Scenarios
1. No referral services.
• Wholesale price: Wo = V l
• Retail prices: P1V l= P2V l= V l
P1V
h, P2V h randomized over  	PhV h,
where
	Ph = V l + u
2−u
V h−V l and
GhP = ProbPh > P= u+p
21−u−p
(
V h− P
P −V l
)

• Franchise fee: F o = u+p/2 
 V h−V l− 1− u+
p/2.
• Manufacturer’s expected proﬁt: o = V l + u +
p
V
h−V l− 2−u−p.
• Total channel proﬁt:  o = V l + u + p 
V h − V l−
2−u−p.
2. Infomediary referrals only. The following is an equilib-
rium if 1−u− 2p1−
 > 0.
• Wholesale price: WI = V l.
• Retail prices: P1V l= P2V l= V l
P2V
h = V h and P1V hP r2 randomly
chosen over  	PhV h, where
	Ph = V l + u
2−u
V h−V l Gh1P= ProbP1V h > P
= u
2−u
V h− P
P −V l
with a mass point u/2−u at V h, and
Gr2P= ProbP r2 >P=
u
21−u
V h− P
P −V l 
• Infomediary fee: KI = 
 u1 − u/2 − u V h −
V l+p.
• Franchise fee: F I = F o − p/2
V h−V l+ .
• Manufacturer proﬁt: I =o −p
V h−V l+ .
• Total channel proﬁt:  I = o +
u1−u/2−u−
p V
h−V l.
3. Both manufacturer and infomediary referrals present.
The equilibrium below holds if (i) , the proportion of
ofﬂine consumers is sufﬁciently high, and (ii) 
1− u+
1−
1−u− 2p > 0.
• Wholesale price: Wm = V l.
• Retail prices: P1V lP1V hP2V lP2V h, and Pr2 all
set as in infomediary-only case.
Pm2 = V h, and Pm1 randomly chosen over
 	PhV h, where
	Ph = W + uV
h−W
2−u
and
Gm1 P = ProbPm1 >P=
u
2−u
V h− P
P −V l 
with a mass point u/2−u at V h.
• Infomediary fee: Km =KI − 1−p.
• Franchise fee: F m = F I + 1−1− u/2.
• Manufacturer proﬁt: m = I + 1 − 2 − u −
1−
V l.
• Total channel proﬁt: m =  I + 1 − 2 − u − p
− 1−
V l.
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